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Prediction, Persuasion, and the Jurisprudence of Behaviorism 
Frank Pasquale and Glyn Cashwell1 
A growing chorus of critics has challenged the use of opaque (or merely complex) 
predictive analytics programs to monitor, influence, and assess individuals’ behavior.2 The rise 
of a “black box society” portends profound threats to individual autonomy: when critical data 
and algorithms cannot be a matter of public understanding or debate, both consumers and 
citizens are unable to comprehend how they are being sorted, categorized, and influenced.3 
A predictable counterargument has arisen, discounting the comparative competence of 
human decision-makers. Defending opaque sentencing algorithms, for instance, Christine 
Remington (a Wisconsin assistant attorney general) stated, “We don’t know what’s going on in a 
judge’s head; it’s a black box, too.”4 Of course, a judge must (upon issuing an important 
decision) explain why the decision was made; so too are agencies covered by the Administrative 
Procedure Act obliged to offer a “concise statement of basis and purpose” for rulemaking.5 But 
there is a long tradition of realist commentators dismissing the legal justifications adopted by 
judges and administrators as unconvincing fig leaves for the “real” (non-legal) bases of their 
decisions. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the realist disdain for stated rationales for 
decisions led in at least two directions: toward more rigorous and open discussions of policy 
considerations motivating judgments, and toward frank recognition of judges as political actors, 
reflecting certain ideologies, values, and interests. In the 21st century, a new response is 
beginning to emerge: a deployment of natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning 
(ML) techniques to predict whether judges will hear a case, and if so, how they will decide it. 
Machine learning experts are busily feeding algorithms the opinions of the US Supreme Court, 
European Court of Human Rights, and other judicial bodies, as well as metadata on justices’ 
ideological commitments, past voting record, and myriad other variables. By processing data 
related to cases, and the text of opinions, these systems purport to predict how judges will decide 
cases, how individual judges will vote, and how to optimize submissions and arguments before 
them. 
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This form of prediction is analogous to forecasters using big data (rather than 
understanding underlying atmospheric dynamics) to predict the movement of storms. An 
algorithmic analysis of a database of, say, 10,000 past cumulonimbi sweeping over Lake 
Ontario, may prove a better predictor of the next cumulonimbus’s track, than a trained 
meteorologist without access to such a data trove. From the perspective of many predictive 
analytics approaches, judges are just like any other living feature of the natural world - an entity 
that transforms certain inputs (such as briefs and advocacy documents) into outputs (decisions 
for or against a litigant). Just as forecasters predict whether a cloud will veer southwest or 
southeast, the user of a machine learning system might use machine-readable case characteristics 
to predict whether a rainmaker will prevail in the courtroom. 
We call the use of algorithmic predictive analytics in judicial contexts an emerging 
jurisprudence of behaviorism, as it rests on a fundamentally Skinnerian model of cognition as a 
black boxed transformation of inputs into outputs.6 In this model, persuasion is passé; what 
matters is prediction.7 After describing and critiquing a recent study that has advanced this 
jurisprudence of behaviorism, we question the value of such research.  
Billed as a method of enhancing the legitimacy and efficiency of the legal system, such 
modeling is all too likely to become one more tool deployed by richer litigants to gain 
advantages over poorer ones.8  Moreover, it should raise suspicions if it is used as a triage tool to 
determine the priority of cases. Such predictive analytics are also only as good as the training 
data they depend on. While fundamental physical laws rarely if ever change, human behavior can 
change dramatically in a short period of time. Therefore, one should always be cautious when 
applying automated methods in the human context, where factors as basic as free will and 
political change make the behavior of both decision-makers, and those they impact, impossible 
to predict with certainty.9  
Nor are predictive analytics immune from bias. Just as judges bring biases into the 
courtroom, algorithm developers are prone to incorporate their own prejudices and priors into 
their machinery.10 Nor are biases easier to address in software than in decisions justified by 
natural language. Such judicial opinions (or even oral statements) are generally much less 
opaque than machine learning algorithms. Unlike many proprietary or hopelessly opaque 
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computational processes proposed to replace them, judges and clerks can be questioned and 
rebuked for discriminatory behavior.11 
There is a growing literature critiquing the unreflective application of machine learning 
techniques to social problems.12 Predictive analytics may reflect biases rather than reasoned 
decisionmaking.13 They also leave those affected by automated sorting and categorizing unable 
to understand the basis of the decisions affecting them, assuming that the output from the models 
in anyway affects one’s life, liberty, or property rights and that litigants are not given the basis of 
the model’s predictions.14 This article questions the social utility of prediction models as applied 
to the judicial system, arguing that their deployment may endanger core rule of law values. In 
full bloom, predictive analytics would not simply be a camera trained on the judicial system, 
reporting on it, but it would also be an engine of influence. Attorneys may decide whether to 
pursue cases based on such systems; courts swamped by appeals or applications may be tempted 
to use machine learning models to triage or prioritize cases. 
In work published to widespread acclaim in 2016, Nikolaos Aletras, Dimitrios 
Tsarapatsanis, Daniel Preoţiuc-Pietro, and Vasileios Lampos made bold claims about the place of 
natural language processing in the legal system in their article, Predicting Judicial Decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective (“Predicting 
Judicial Decisions”).15  They claim that “advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP) and 
Machine Learning (ML) provide us with the tools to automatically analyse legal materials, so as 
to build successful predictive models of judicial outcomes.”16 Presumably they are referring to 
their own work as part of these advances. However, close analysis of their “systematic study on 
predicting the outcome of cases tried by the European Court of Human Rights based solely on 
textual content” reveals that their soi-disant “success” merits closer scrutiny, on both positive 
and normative grounds. 
The first questions to be asked about a study like Predicting Judicial Decisions are: what 
are its uses and purposes? Aletras et al. suggest at least three. First, they present their work as a 
first step toward the development of machine learning (ML) and natural language processing 
(NLP) software that can predict how judges and other authorities will decide legal disputes. 
Second, Nikos Aletras has clearly stated to media that artificial intelligence “could also be a 
valuable tool for highlighting which cases are most likely to be violations of the European 
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Convention of Human Rights”—in other words, that it could help courts triage which cases they 
should hear.17 Third, they purport to intervene in a classic jurisprudential debate—whether facts 
or law matter more in judicial determinations.18  Each of these aims and claims should be 
rigorously interrogated, given shortcomings of the study that the authors acknowledge. Beyond 
those acknowledged problems, there are even more faults in their approach which cast doubt on 
whether the research program of NLP-based prediction of judicial outcomes, even if pursued in a 
more realistic manner, has anything significant to contribute to our understanding of the legal 
system. 
Though Aletras et al. have used rigorous ML and NLP methods in their study, their 
approach metaphorically stacks the deck in so many ways that it is hard to see its relevance to 
either practicing lawyers or scholars. Nor is it likely to be ethical for attorneys to use even 
refined approaches arising out of this line of research, to influence judges by deploying words or 
word structure found likely to have stimulated positive outcomes in the past, if such a 
deployment of the method is premised on subliminal or otherwise undetectable influence.  Nor is 
it plausible to state that a method this crude, and disconnected from actual legal meaning, 
provides empirical data relevant to jurisprudential debates over legal formalism and realism. 
There is an inevitable interface of human meaning that is necessary to make sense of social 
institutions like law. Machine “learning” is nowhere near simulating it, let alone understanding it 
in recognizably human terms.19  
II. Stacking the Deck: “Predicting” the Contemporaneous 
 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) hears cases in which parties allege that 
their rights under Articles of the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention) were 
violated and not remedied by their country’s courts.20 The researchers claim that the textual 
model has an accuracy of “79% on average.”21 Given sweepingly futuristic headlines generated 
by the study (including “Could AI replace judges and lawyers?”),22 a casual reader of reports on 
the study might assume that this finding means that, using the method of the researchers, those 
who have some aggregation of data and text about case filings, can use that data to predict how 
the ECHR will decide a case, with 79% accuracy. But that would not be accurate. Instead, the 
researchers used the “‘Circumstances’ subsection” in the cases they claimed to “predict,” which 
had “been formulated by the Court itself.”23 In other words, they claimed to be “predicting” an 
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event (a decision) based on materials released simultaneously with the decision. This is a bit like 
claiming to “predict” whether a judge had cereal for breakfast yesterday, based on a report of the 
nutritional composition of the materials on the judge’s plate at the exact time she or he consumed 
the breakfast.24 Readers can (and should) balk at using the term “prediction” to describe 
correlations between past events (like decisions of a court) and contemporaneously generated, 
past data (like the Circumstances subsection of a case). Sadly, though, few journalists 
breathlessly reporting the Aletras et al. study did so—and the authors do not appear to have done 
enough to disabuse them of their sensational extrapolations. 
To their credit, Aletras et al. repeatedly emphasize how much they have effectively 
stacked the deck by using ECHR-generated documents themselves to help the ML/NLP software 
they are using in the study “predict” the outcomes of the cases associated with those documents. 
A truly predictive system would use filings of the parties, or data outside the filings, in existence 
before the judgement itself. Aletras et al. grudgingly acknowledge that the Circumstances 
subsection “should not always be understood as a neutral mirroring of the factual background of 
the case,” but defend their method by stating “summaries of facts found in the ‘Circumstances’ 
section have to be at least framed in as neutral and impartial a way as possible.”25 However, they 
give readers no clear guide as to when the Circumstances subsection is actually a neutral 
mirroring of factual background, or how closely it relates to records in existence before a 
judgment that would actually be useful to those aspiring to develop a predictive system.  
 Instead, their “premise is that published judgments can be used to test the possibility of a 
text-based analysis for ex ante predictions of outcomes on the assumption that there is enough 
similarity between (at least) certain chunks of the text of published judgments and applications 
lodged with the Court and/or briefs submitted by parties with respect to pending cases.”26 But 
they give us few compelling reasons to accept that assumption, since almost any judge writing an 
opinion to justify a judgment is going to develop a facts section fully aware of how its preferred 
interpretation of the law is more likely to be supported by some renditions of the facts rather than 
others. The authors state that the ECHR has “limited fact finding powers,” but give no sense of 
how much that mitigates that problem of law-driven cherry-picking (highlighting favorable facts) 
or lemon-dropping (failing to mention unfavorable facts). Nor should we be comforted (as the 
authors apparently are) by the fact that “the Court cannot openly acknowledge any kind of bias 
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on its part”—indeed, that suggests a need for the Court to avoid the main type of transparency in 
published justification that could help researchers artificially limited to NLP better understand 
it.27 The authors also state that in the “vast majority of cases,” the “parties do not seem to dispute 
the facts themselves, as contained in the ‘Circumstances’ subsection, but only their legal 
significance.” However, the critical issues here are, first, the facts themselves, and second, how 
the parties characterized the facts before the Circumstances section was written. Again, the 
fundamental problem of mischaracterization—of “prediction,” instead of mere correlation or 
relationship—crops up to undermine the value of the study. 
Even in its most academic mode—as an ostensibly empirical analysis of the prevalence 
of legal realism—the Aletras et al. study stacks the deck in its favor in important ways. Indeed, it 
might be seen as assuming at the outset a version of the very hypothesis it ostensibly supports. 
That hypothesis is that something other than legal reasoning itself drives judicial decisions. Of 
course that is true in a trivial sense—there is no case if there are no facts—and perhaps the 
authors intend to make that trivial point.28 But their language suggests a larger aim, designed to 
meld NLP and jurisprudence. Given the critical role of meaning in the latter discipline, and their 
NLP methods’ indifference to it, one might expect an unhappy coupling here. And that is indeed 
what we find. 
In Aletras et al.’s study, the corpus used for the predictive algorithm was a body of Court 
of Human Rights’ “published judgments.” Within these judgments, a summary of the factual 
background of the case was summarized (by the Court) in the “Circumstances” section of the 
judgments, but pleadings themselves were not included as inputs.29 The law section, which 
“considers the merits of the case, through the use of legal argument,” was also input into the 
model to determine how well that section alone could “predict” the case outcome.30  
Aletras et al. were selective in the corpus they fed to their algorithms. The only 
judgments that were included in the corpus were those that passed both a “prejudicial stage” and 
a second review.31 In both stages, applications are denied if they do not meet “admissibility 
criteria,” which are largely procedural in nature.32 To the extent such procedural barriers are 
deemed “legal,” we might immediately identify a bias problem in the corpus—that is, the types 
of cases where the law entirely determined the outcome (no matter how compelling the facts may 
have been) were removed from a data set ostensibly fairly representative of the universe of cases 
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generally. This is not a small problem, either: the overwhelming majority of applications are 
deemed inadmissible or struck out, and are not reportable.33  
But let us assume, for now, that the model only aspires to offer data about the 
realist/formalist divide in cases that do meet admissibility criteria. There are other biases in the 
data set. Only cases that were in English, approximately 33% of total ECHR decisions, are 
included.34 This is a strange omission, since the NLP approach employed here has no semantic 
content—that is, the meaning of the words does not matter to it. Presumably this omission arose 
out of concerns to make data coding and processing easier. 
There is also a subject matter restriction that further limits the scope of the sample. Only 
cases addressing issues in Articles 3, 6, and 8 of the Convention were included in training and in 
verifying the model. And there is yet another limitation: the researchers then threw cases out 
randomly (so that the dataset contained an equal number of violation/no violation cases) before 
using them as training data.35  
III. Problematic Characteristics of the ECHR Textual “Predictive” Model 
The algorithm used in the case depended on an atomization of case language into words 
grouped together in sets of one, two, three, and four-word groupings, called N-grams.36 Then, the 
most frequent 2,000 N-grams, not taking into consideration “grammar, syntax and word order,” 
were placed in feature matrices for each section of decisions and for the entire case by using the 
vectors from each decision.37 Topics, which are created by “clustering together n-grams”, were 
also created.38 Both topics and N-grams were used to “to train Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
classifiers.” As the authors explain, an “SVM is a machine learning algorithm that has shown 
particularly good results in text classification, especially using small data sets.”39   
Model training data from these opinions were “n-gram features,” which consist of groups 
of words that “appear in similar contexts.”40 Matrix mathematics, which are manipulations on 2-
dimensional tables, and vector space models, which are based on a single column within a table, 
were programmed to determine clusters of words that should be similar to one another based on 
textual context.41 These clusters of words are called topics. The model prevented a word group 
from showing up in more than one topic. Thirty topics, or sets of similar word groupings, were 
also created for entire court opinions. Topics were similarly created for entire opinions for each 
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article.42 As the Court opinions all follow a standard format, the opinions could be easily 
dissected into different identifiable sections.43 
Note that these sorting methods are as legally meaningless as they are mathematically 
sophisticated.44 N-grams and topics are not sorted the way a treatise-write might try to organize 
cases, or a judge might try to parse divergent lines of precedent. Rather, they simply serve as 
potential independent variables to predict a dependent variable (was there a violation, or was 
there not a violation, of the Convention).   
Before going further into the technical details of the study, it is useful to compare it to 
prior successes of machine learning, in facial or number recognition. When a facial recognition 
program successfully identifies a given picture as an image of a given person, it does not 
necessarily achieve that machine vision in the way a human being’s eye and brain would do so. 
Rather, an initial, training set of images (or perhaps even a single image) of the person are 
processed, perhaps on a 1,000 by 1,000-pixel grid. Each box in the grid can be identified as 
either skin or not-skin, smooth or not-smooth, along hundreds or even thousands of binaries—
many of which would never be noticeable by the human eye. Moreover, such parameters can be 
related to one another—so, for example, regions hued as “lips” or “eyes” might have a certain 
maximum length or width—or, ratio to one another (such that a person’s facial “signature” 
reliably has eyes that are 1.35 times as long as they are wide). Add up enough of these ratios for 
easily recognized features (ears, eyebrows, foreheads, etc.), and software can quickly find a set 
of mathematical parameters unique to a given person—or at least unique enough that an 
algorithm can predict a given picture is, or is not, a picture of a given person, with a high degree 
of accuracy. The technology found early commercial success with banks, which needed a way to 
recognize numbers on checks (given the wide variety of human handwriting). With enough 
examples of written numbers (properly reduced to data via dark or filled spaces on a grid), and 
computational power, that recognition can become near-perfect. 
Before assenting too quickly to the application of such methods to words in cases (as we 
see them applied to features of faces), we should note that there are not professions of “face 
recognizers,” or “number recognizers,” among human beings. So while Facebook’s face 
recognition algorithm, or TD Bank’s check sorter, do not obviously challenge our intuitions 
about how we recognize faces or numbers, applying ML to legal cases should be marked as a 
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jarring imperialism of ML methods into domains associated with a rich history of meaning (and, 
to use a classic term from the philosophy of social sciences, Verstehen). In the realm of face 
recognizing, “whatever works” as a pragmatic ethic of effectiveness underwrites some societies’ 
acceptance of width/length ratios and other methods to assure algorithmic recognition of 
individuals.45 The application of ML approaches devoid of apprehension of meaning in the legal 
context is more troubling. 
For example, Aletras et al. acknowledge that there are cases where the model predicts the 
incorrect outcome because of the similarity in words in cases that had opposite results.  In that 
case, even if information regarding specific words that triggered the SVM classifier were output, 
users might not be able to easily determine that the case was likely misclassified.46 Even with 
confidence interval outputs, this type of problem does not appear to have an easy solution. This 
is particularly troubling for due process if such an algorithm, in error, incorrectly classified 
someone’s case because it contained language similarities to another very different case.47 When 
the cases are obviously misclassified in this way, models like this would likely “surreptitiously 
embed biases, mistakes and discrimination, and worse yet, even reiterate and reinforce them on 
the new cases processed.”48 So, too, might a batch of training data representing a certain time 
period when a certain class of cases was dominant, help ensure the dominance of such cases in 
the future. For example, the “most predictive topic” for Article 8 decisions included prominently 
the words “son, body, result, russian.” If the system were used in the future to triage cases, 
ceteris paribus, it might prioritize cases involving sons over daughters, or Russians over Poles.49 
But if those future cases do not share the characteristics of the cases in the training set that led to 
the “predictiveness” of “son” status or “Russian” status, their prioritization would be a clear legal 
mistake. Indeed, they could result in a denial of due process, which guarantees each individual a 
right for their case to be heard on its own merits, rather than instantly assimilated (on 
inarticulable grounds) into some broader category. 
 Troublingly, the entire “predictive” project here may be riddled with spurious or biased 
correlations.50 As any student of statistics knows, if one tests enough data sets against one 
another, spurious correlations will emerge. For example, Tyler Vigen has shown a very tight 
correlation between the divorce rate in Maine and per capita consumption of margarine between 
2000 and 2009.51 It is unlikely that one variable there is driving the other. Nor is it likely that 
some intervening variable is affecting both butter consumption and divorce rates in a similar 
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way, to ensure a similar correlation in the future. Rather, this is just the type of random 
association one might expect to emerge once one has thrown enough computing power at enough 
data sets. 
 It is hard not to draw similar conclusions with respect to Aletras et al.’s “predictive” 
project. Draw enough variations from the “bag of words,” and some relationships will emerge. 
Given that the algorithm only had to predict “violation” or “no-violation,” even a random 
guessing program would be expected to have a 50% accuracy rate. A thought experiment easily 
deflates the meaning of their trumpeted 79% “accuracy.” Imagine that the authors had continual 
real time surveillance of every aspect of the judges’ lives before they wrote their opinions: the 
size of the buttons on their shirts and blouses, calories consumed at breakfast, average speed of 
commute, height and weight, and so forth. Given a near infinite number of parameters of 
evaluation, it is altogether possible that they could find that a cluster of data around breakfast 
type, or button size, or some similarly irrelevant characteristics, also added an increment of 
roughly 29% accuracy to the baseline 50% accuracy achieved via randomness (or always 
guessing violation). Should scholars celebrate the “artificial intelligence” behind such a finding? 
No. Ideally they would chuckle at it, as readers of Vigen’s website find amusement at random 
relationships between, say, number of letters in winning words at the National Spelling Bee, and 
number of people killed by venomous spiders (which enjoys a 80.57% correlation). 
 This may seem unfair to Aletras et al., since they are using so much more advanced math 
than Vigen is. However, their models do not factor in meaning, which is of paramount 
importance in rights determinations. To be sure, words like “burial,” “attack,” and “died” do 
appear properly predictive, to some extent, in Article 8 decisions, and cause no surprise when 
they are predictive of violations.52 But what are we to make of inclusion of words like “result” in 
the same list? There is little to no reasoned explanation in their work, as to why such words 
should be predictive with respect to the corpus, let alone future case law. 
 This is deeply troubling, because it is a foundational principle of both administrative and 
evidence law that irrelevant factors should not factor into a decision.  To be sure, there is little 
reason the ECHR would use such a crude model to determining the outcome of cases before it, or 
even to use it as a decision aide. However, software applications often are used in ways that they 
were not intended. When they are billed as predictive models,  attorneys and others could likely 
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use the models for their own triage purposes. This is especially dangerous when attorneys are 
generally not very familiar with statistical analysis and machine learning. The legal community’s 
ability to scrutinize such models, and correctly interpret their results, is questionable.53 
Journalistic hype around studies like this one shows that public understanding is likely even 
more impaired.54 
Aletras et al. are aware of many problems with their approach, and continually hedge 
about its utility in the paper. But they still assert:  
Overall, we believe that building a text-based predictive system of judicial decisions can 
offer lawyers and judges a useful assisting tool. The system may be used to rapidly 
identify cases and extract patterns that correlate with certain outcomes. It can also be 
used to develop prior indicators for diagnosing potential violations of specific Articles in 
lodged applications and eventually prioritise the decision process on cases where 
violation seems very likely. This may improve the significant delay imposed by the Court 
and encourage more applications by individuals who may have been discouraged by the 
expected time delays.55 
The paper’s abstract claims the model “can be useful, for both lawyers and judges, as an assisting 
tool to rapidly identify cases and extract patterns which lead to certain decisions.” Aletras, in a 
podcast interview, also stated that the model could be used for case triage.56 However, a judicial 
system that did so, without attending to all the critiques we have developed above (and perhaps 
many more), would seriously jeopardize its legitimacy. 
For example, consider how non-representative the training data here is. Aletras et al. 
openly acknowledges a potential issue with “selection effect”, or the ability of the model to be 
useful to the multitude of cases that were dismissed before being heard by the Grand Chamber.57 
Petitions that were determined to be inadmissible before trial were not included in this study, as 
they are “not reported.” Therefore, the model’s output is narrowed significantly. Despite these 
problems, there is a danger that the model could be deployed by bureaucrats at the ECHR to 
prioritize certain petitions, given that the Court is deluged with thousands of petitions each year, 
and can only decide a fraction of those cases. Without a clear understanding of how the model is 
predicting the success of a claim, it would be irresponsible for judges or their clerks or 
subordinates to use it.58  
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IV. Conclusion 
This article has explored shortcomings of Aletras et al.’s Predicting Judicial Decisions, 
to question the nature, purpose, and likely results of computational analysis of legal corpora. We 
believe the social value of pure ML/NLP-based prediction of judicial decisions, divorced from 
analysis of the meaning of the texts analysed, is frequently overstated. We also believe that such 
predictive tools are, at present, largely irrelevant to debates in jurisprudence. If they continue to 
gloss over the question of social and human meaning in legal systems, NLP researchers should 
expect justified neglect of their work by governments, law firms, businesses, and the legal 
academy.59  
Efficiency simpliciter is not an adequate rationale for modeling predictions of judicial 
behavior. Nor are such approaches’ potential to generate more complaints and litigation (where 
success is predicted) or to discourage such interventions (where success is not predicted) 
necessarily a positive affordance for society as a whole. Critics of machine learning have long 
complained that the bias in corpora of past data may simply be recycled into bias in future 
predictions. Heretofore, authors who have attempted to model the future behavior of courts from 
their past behavior have given us little sense of how well such biases may be counteracted, or 
even detected, once their approaches are more widely disseminated.  
The legal trade press often heralds computational modeling of judicial behavior as an 
advance in access to justice: the better we (or, more precisely, those with access to the right data 
sets and other resources) can predict judgments, so the thinking goes, the better we can know 
what penalties law-breaking will result in. But technophiles underestimate the degree to which 
inequality in access to human attorneys is exacerbated by current inequality in access to the best 
software, legal analytics, and other technology, and by the many ways in which past inequality 
deeply shaped training data.  
To be sure, predictive analytics in law may improve over time. But that possibility does 
not undermine our position. The most important contribution of our critique is not to cast doubt 
on the likelihood of further advances in algorithms’ predictive power; rather, we question where 
the results of such projects are useful to the legal system, and demonstrate how they threaten to 
undermine its legitimacy. The pragmatic and the critical uses of predictive algorithms are deeply 
in tension. An analyst may reveal biases in judgments, such as legally irrelevant details that 
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somehow seem to be correlated with, and perhaps even driving, decisions. The same analyst may 
sell the predictive tool to attorneys or courts, as a case selection or triage tool. But precisely to 
the extent past training data reflect bias, they are likely to reinforce and spread the influence of 
that bias when they are utilized by actors outside the judicial system (who may, for example, not 
even try to advocate for a particular class of meritorious cases, since decisionmakers are 
systematically biased against them). Academics should never assume that merely increasing the 
ability to predict the future (or analyze what was most important in decisions of the past) is an 
unalloyed good. Rather, a long history of social scientific research on reflexivity reveals how 
easily such analysis can exacerbate, rather than resolve, the problems it reveals. 
To the extent such reflexivity develops, better that the Pandora’s Box of legal predictive 
analytics had never been opened. Machine learning may simply replay regrettable aspects of the 
past into the future. On the other hand, once robust predictive models are available, jurisdictions 
should carefully consider rules to level the playing field, to ensure that all parties to a dispute 
have access to critical technology. The law itself is free to consult and copy. To the extent that 
legal technology determines or heavily influences advocacy, it, too, should be open on equal 
terms to all parties to a dispute. And at the very least, any deployment of such approaches during 
litigation should be revealed to the judge presiding over it, and to opposing parties, when it is 
deployed. Such a general rule of disclosure is vital to future efforts to understand the influence of 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, and predictive analytics, on the legal system as a whole. 
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